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STUDENT NOTE
POWER OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES TO GRANT REHEARINGS.-
Fundamental in the field of administrative law is the proposition
that an administrative agency has no inherent powers but only such
powers as have been expressly granted to it by the legislature or
have, by implication, been conferred upon it as necessarily incident
to the exercise of those powers expressly granted.'
For the purpose of this note it will be assumed that the power
of an administrative agency to grant rehearings is not hampered by
the principles of stare decisis, res judicata or estoppel to reconsider
Gallagher's Steak House v. Bowles, 142 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 322 U. S. 764 (1944); Northern States Power Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 118 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1941); In re Electric Bond & Share Co., 80 F.
Supp. 795 (S. D. N. Y. 1948); Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. Panhandle Eastern
Pipe Line Co., 80 F. Supp. 27 (E. D. Mich. 1948); Wheeler v. Santa Ana, 81
Cal. App.2d 811, 185 P.2d 273 (1947); State v. Atlantic Coast L. R. R., 56 Fla.
617, 47 So. 969 (1908); Portsmouth v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co., 141 Va. 54,
126 S, E. 362 (1925); State v. Dep't of Public Service, 21 Wash.2d 201, 150 P.2d
709 (1944).
1
M. and B.: Power of Administrative Agencies to Grant Rehearings
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1950
STUDENT NOTE
and redetermine a previous decision,2 although some courts have
denied to the agency the' power to grant rehearings upon such
principles.3
It must be conceded at the outset that a generalization with
respect to the powers of administrative bodies to grant rehearings,
in the absence of express statutory authority, cannot be made.
Statutes creating administrative agencies and defining their
scope of power often provide for a procedure whereby a party
aggrieved, or any party to the order, may petition for rehearing.4
But in many instances statutes are silent as to this power.r
It is usually said that a petition for rehearing is addressed to
the sound discretion of the agency" and all that is required of the
agency is that it consider and dispose of the petition.' The petition
is not addressed to the discretion of a reviewing court.s An abuse
of the agency's discretion, however, may result in a remand for
rehearing when the matter is presented to a reviewing court.0 Even
this doctrine is strictly limited, and an agency's action on a petition
will be reversed only upon the clearest showing of an abuse of
discretion.'0
2 As to this problem, see generally: Davis, Res Judicata in Administrative
Law, 25 TEX. L. REv. 199 (1947); Schopflocher, The Doctrine of Res Judicata
in Administrative Law, 1942 Wis. L. REv. 5 and 198; Administrative Law-Res
Judicata-Binding Effect of Prior Ruling on Commission, 22 B. U. L. REv. 100
(1942); Res Judicata in Administrative Law, 49 YALE L. J. 1250 (1940).
" E.g., Johnson v. Betts, 21 Ariz. 365, 188 Pac. 271 (1920); Centraha Coal Co.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 297 Ill. 451, 130 N. E. 727 (1921); Happy Coal Co. v.
Hartbarger, 251 Ky. 779, 65 S. W.2d 977 (1934); Sioux County v. Jameson, 43
Nebr. 265, 61 N. W. 596 (1895).
4 E.g., COMMUNICATIONs Acr, 48 STAT. 1095 (1934), 47 U. S. C. §405 (1946);
FEDERAL POWER Acr, 49 STAT. 860 (1935), 16 U. S. C. §825 (1) (1946); INTERSTATE
ComERcE ACT, 54 STAT. 913 (1940), 49 U. S. C. §17 (1946).
5 E.g., SECUUTY Acr, 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. §77a et seq. (1946);
SECUIUuES EXCHANGE ACT, 48 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U. S. C. §7 et seq. (1946);
BiruNnNous COAL Acr, 50 STAT. 72 (1937), 15 U. S. C. §828 et seq. (1946).
6 United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, 327 U. S. 515 (1946); Interstate
Commerce Comm'n v. Jersey City, 322 U. S. 503 (1944); St. Joseph Stock Yards
Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 (1936); United States ex rel. Maine Potato
Shippers Ass'n v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 88 F.2d 780 (D. C. Cir. 1936),
cert. denied, 300 U. S. 684 (1937); Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United
States, 4 F. Supp. 745 (E. D. Mo. 1933).
7 Carolina Aluminum Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 97 F.2d 435 (4th Cir.
1938); N. L. R. B. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 120 F.2d 1004 (3d Cir. 1941);
Mhniglia v. Commander of The Guiseppe Verdi, 5 F.2d 680 (D. Mass. 1925).
s Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Jersey City, 322 U. S. 503 (1944).
9 Atchison, Topeka & S. F. Ry. v. United States, 284 U. S. 248 (1932) (refusal
to grant rehearing because of radically changed conditions considered an abuse
of discretion and a denial of due process); Comment, 6 ST. JoHN's L. REv.
390 (1932).
10 United States v. Northern Pacific Ry., 288 U. S. 490 (1933); Baltimore &
0. R. R. v. United States, 298 U. S. 349, 389 (1936) (Justice Brandeis stated:
2
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The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals as early as 1915
implicitly recognized the power of an administrative agency to grant
a rehearing" although the agency was not by statute expressly
authorized to do so. 1 2 More recently, in Atlantic Greyhound Corp.
v. Public Service Comm'n,"3 the West Virginia court explicitly held
valid a rule of the public service commission permitting a rehearing
upon petition, 4 although there is no statutory provision which in
express terms confers authority upon the commission to grant a
rehearing.' 5 The authority to promulgate such a rule was held
to be vested in the agency by virtue of the statutory provision
authorizing it, in general terms, to prescribe rules of practice and
procedure.0
The view of the West Virginia court in the Atlantic Greyhound
case17 is by no means unanimous. Authority exists in support of
the dissent in that case, the essence of which was: "Regulatory
bodies, similar to the public service commission of this State, have
no power to grant rehearings in a proceeding which has been dis-
posed of by final order, in the absence of statute conferring such
power upon them." In Aylward v. State Board of Chiropractia
"The Atchison case [supre note 8] rests upon its exceptional facts. It is
apparently the only instance in which this Court has interfered with the
exercise of the Commission's discretion in granting or refusing to reopen a
hearing"); United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, 327 U. S. 515 (1946);
Lang Transp. Corp. v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 915 (S. D. Cal. 1948).
x1 Poccardi v. Public Service Comm'n, 75 W. Va. 542, 548, 84 S. E. 242, 245
(1915).
12 XV. VA. CODE ANN. C. 15p, §1 et seq. (Hogg, 1913). Although not expressly
providing for rehearing §40 stated: "The power and jurisdiction of the com-
mission over each case shall be continuing, and it may from time to time make
such modifications or change with respect to former findings or orders with
respect thereto, as, in its opinion, may be justified." Chapter 15p dealt with
workmen's compensation, which was at that time administered by the public
service commission. On looking to the chapter relating to the public service
commission, id. at c. 150, §1 etseq., no provisions are found relating to rehearings,
although §2 of c. 150 provided generally that "the commission shall prescribe
the rules of procedure and for taking evidence in all matters that mAy come
before it, and enter such final orders as may be just and lawful."
'3 54 S. E.2d 169 (W. Va. 1949).
14 Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Public Service Commission,
Rule 19, Par. (a).
35 W. VA. REv. CODE c. 24 and 24A (Michie, 1943).
1 W. VA. Rxv. CODE c. 24, art. 1, §7 (Michie, 1943), reads: "The commission
shall prescribe rules of procedure and for taking evidence in all matters that
may come before it, and enter such orders as may be just and lawful." Id. at c.
24A (regulation of motor carriers), art. 5, §5 provides: The commission may: (a)
prescribe rules of practice and procedure, the method and manner of holding
hearings, and for taking evidence on all matters that may come before it, and
enter such orders as may be just and lawful."
'7 Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 54 S. E.2d 169
(W. Va. 1949).
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Examiners,"' it was held that upon making a final determination of
a question of fact, the administrative agency exhausted its authority,
and could not grant a rehearing as no statute specifically provided
for one. It seems that North Carolina Utilities Comm'n v. Norfolk
So. Ry. 19 supports this view. In that case, however, there were
statutory provisions relating to rehearings and the precise holding
was that an administrative agency (specifically the utilities com-
mission of North Carolina) could not grant rehearings other than
in the manner provided by statute. Without citation of authority
to sustain it, it was said by the court in the North Carolina Utilities
Commission case,20 "The Interstate Commerce Commission ap-
parently did not have the authority to grant a rehearing until the
enactment of the Hepburn Act 21 in 1906, expressly empowering it
to do so." No cases have been found confirming this dictum but,
on the contrary, the Interstate Commerce Commission from its
inception 2 2 assumed that it was authorized to rehear proceedings
on their merits, and a fortiori, acted upon that assumption long
before the passage of the Hepburn Act.23 An agency's construction
of its own powers should be given great weight where the construc-
tion adopted does not contravene any prohibitions expressed or
implied in the statute creating it. 24  As was stated in Froeber-
18 31 Cal. 833, 192 P.2d 929 (1948).
19 224 N. C. 762, 32 S. E.2d 346 (1944).
20 Id. at 764, 32 S. E.2d at 347.
21 34 STAT. 592 (1906), 49 U. S. C. §16a (1946). Section 16a was repealed,
however, by 54 STAT. 913 (1940), 49 U.S. C. §17 (1946), and the rehearing provision
may now be found in 49 U. S. C. §17 (1946).
22 24 STAT. 379, 49 U. S. C. §1 et seq. (1946) (Interstate Commerce Act).
2.3 Riddle, Dean & Co. v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R. R., 1 1. C. C. 773 (1888);
Rice v. Western New York & P. R. R., 2 I. C. C. 496 (1889); Bates v. Pennsylvania
R. R., 3 1. C. C. 296 (1890); Independent Refiners' Ass'n v. Pennsylvania R. R.,
4 I. C. C. 369 (1893); Rice v. Western N. Y. N. P. R. R., 6 I. C. C. 455 (1895);
Richmond Elevator Co. v. Pere Marquette R. R., 10 I. C. C. 629 (1905). The
Interstate Commerce Commission in 1905, in its Nineteenth Annual Report to
Congress, requested an express provision be made for rehearings by the com-
mission. The report stated: A new section is here added, to be known as section
16a [of the Hepburn Act of 1906, note 21, supra], which expressly authorizes
the Commission to review and modify its own decisions. It may be that this
right now exists by implication, but it ought not to be open to doubt or
question." (Emphasis added). ANN. REP. I. C. C. 12 (1905).
24 United States v. Citizens Loan & Trust Co., 316 U. S. 209 (1942); United
States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U. S. 534 (1940); United States v.
Madigan, 300 U. S. 500 (1937); Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United
States, 288 U. S. 294 (1933); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. New Process Production
Co., 129 Tex. 617, 104 S. W.2d 1106 (1937); Neubert v. Chicago, R. I. & G.
Ry., 116 Tex. 644, 296 S. W. 1090 (1927); Daniel v. Simms, 49 W. Va. 544, 39
S. E. 690 (1901); State ex rel. Brandon v. Board of Control, 84 W. Va. 417,
100 S. E. 215 (1919).
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Norfleet, Inc. v. Southern Ry.,2 5 "The wisdom of such power in
[the agency] is for Congress and not the courts." An expression
by Congress confirming the agency's interpretation of this pro-
cedural power should not be taken to mean that the agency's action
was ultra vires prior to such affirmance.
A state tax commission was denied the power to grant a rehear-
ing, there being no specific authorization for it to do so, where the
commission had, after hearing, previously entered an order affirm-
ing an assessment and denying protest.21 The statute involved
placed no restrictions upon the commission as to when or how many
corrections it might make in assessments, but rather provided that
corrections or additional assessments of income could be made
within three years after the close of the period covered by a report
of income.27  It would seem, then, that additional hearings could
have been properly granted to allow corrections; however, the
jurisdiction of the agency was held to be exhausted, especially in
view of the fact that provision was made for judicial review of the
agency's determinations, and resort to such judicial review was not
made within the required period of time.
Undoubtedly the reluctance of some courts to recognize a
continuing jurisdiction in the administrative agency, absent specific
statutory authorization, has been motivated by the traditional
jealousy of administrative tribunals by the courts. The untenable-
ness of the view which restricts an agency to the precise bounds of
statutory language and prohibits an agency to promulgate rules
whereby rehearings may be held upon petition of an interested
party or, for that matter, by the agency on its own motion, may
be best illustrated by the cases adhering to a contrary rule.
2
In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. State,2 9 a corporation
commission was held to have implied powers to entertain applica-
tions for rehearing and to set aside a previous order as to reasonable-
ness of rates, assuming no appeal had been lodged in the appellate
court. In Ellard v. Finkelstein o and Rosenblatt v. Finkelsteinsl
-5 9 F. Supp. 409 (N. D. Ga. 1934).
-s Magma Copper Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 67 Ariz. 77, 191 P.2d 169
(1948).
-7 Aiuz. CoDE §§73-1536 (1939).
2s This is not to say that sheer weight of authority is of itself a reason for
the rule, but rather that un examination of cases permitting an administrative
body to grant a rehearing as a necessary incident to the exercise of powers
expressly granted makes the rationale of the rule less difficult.
29 181 Okla. 246, 71 P.2d 747 (1937).
30 84 N. Y. S.2d 220 (1948).
31 84 N. Y. S.2d 193 (1948).
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the power of a rent commission to grant rehearing was taken for
granted, although "nowhere in the statute or local laws [was] the
commission given express authority to grant rehearings."
Arguments advanced against the power of an administrative
agency to review its prior determinations (and, if the agency has
the power to review and alter its prior "final" determinations,
ancillary thereto should be the power to grant a rehearing) in the
absence of express statutory authorization were refuted by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Lane v. United States,32 and
in Michigan Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust.33 The Lane case involved
a statute containing a provision to the effect that the decision of
the Secretary of Interior upon notice and hearing under such rules
as he might prescribe, "shall be final and conclusive."'' This pro-
vision was contended to cause a prior order of the Secretary to
completely exhaust his power, therefore giving a character of
absolute finality to such order. In the Lane case35 the court said,
"The words 'final and conclusive' describing the power given to
the Secretary must be taken as conferring, and not limiting or
destroying, that authority. Such right to review by the, administra-
tive agency on the ground of newly discovered evidence or fraud
is of the very essence of administrative authority. The opposite
construction would indeed render the administrative power con-
ferred wholly inadequate for "the purpose intended by the statute."30
In the Michigan Land & Lumber Co. case 37 the court held that the
Secretary of Interior had the general power to recall and rectify
mistakes of survey made in prior certifications of land granted to
states under the Swamp Land Act.38
32 241 U. S. 201 (1916) (former determination by the Secretary of Interior
as to the heir of a deceased Indian "llottee reopened and redetermined).
33 168 U. S. 589 (1897).
34 86 STAT. 855 (1910), as amended, 25 U. S. C. §372 (1946).
35 241 U. S. 201, 209 (1916).
36 36 STAT. 855 (1910), as amended 25 U. S. C. §372 (1946), gave the
Secretary of Interior the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to determine the
heir or heirs of any decedent Indian who had been granted allotments of land
under former acts, and to determine the competency of such heir or heirs to
manage their own affairs, and then to issue to such heir or heirs found competent
a patent for the allotment of such decedent.
37 168 U. S. 589 (1897).
38 9 STAT. 519 (1850), as amended, 43 U. S. C. §983 (1946). This view was
taken by the Court notwithstanding a later act, 11 STAT. 251 (1857), as amended,
43 U. S. C. §986 (1946), which provided that the selection of swamp lands
theretofore made under the Swamp Land Act should be approved and patented
to the states. The later act was said not intended to apply to and confirm old
lists founded on erroneous surveys which had been superseded by new lists,
nor to override the general power of the Secretary of Interior to correct mistakes.
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Administrative agencies have conferred upon them by the
legislature, jurisdiction over complex fields and often of necessity
a jurisdiction so vast is covered in general terms by the legislature.3 9
If the agency is not permitted by implication to fashion its own
procedure so as to achieve the purposes of the legislation creating
the body and defining its substantive powers, then those rights
intended to be safeguarded through the medium of administrative
action may receive hampered and inadequate treatment by the
agency. 40
Most administrative action is subject to some type of judicial
review but administrative determination of facts is ordinarily con-
clusive if supported by substantial evidence. 41 It would seem,
therefore, that in justice both to the parties concerned and to the
agency, the agency, as a procedural matter, should be permitted
to reopen the proceeding and conduct a rehearing to correct mis-
takes and to hear any newly discovered evidence before appeal.
Petition for rehearing "should not be discouraged, but instead
should be encouraged, not to supplant, but to supplement appellate
review." 42 In this connection, it may be noted that a petition for
rehearing may sometimes be regarded as a necessary step to the
exhaustion of administrative remedy4 3 which is a prerequisite to
judicial review.44 Unquestionably, if the statute expressly requires
an application for rehearing as a condition precedent to judicial
review, then the legislative mandate must prevail.4" A provision that
"No objection to the order of the Commission shall be considered
3 State ex rel. State Railroad Comm'n v. Great Northern Ry., 168 Wash.
257, 123 Pac. 8 (1912).
40 In Wallace Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 323 U. S. 248 (1944), the original charge
of an unfair labor practice was lost or stolen, thus preventing the issuance of
an intermediate report of the trial examiner and requiring a hearing de novo,
although statute did not expressly provide for suh procedure.
. 41 Helvering v. Kehoe, 309 U. S. 277 (1940); keesler v. Strecker, 307 U. S.
22 (1939); Shields v. Utah Idaho C. R. Co., 305 U. S. 177 (1938); Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Standard Education Society, 302 U. S. 112 (1937); Ohio Utilities Co.
v. Public Utility Comm'n, 267 U. S. 359 (1925); United States v. Clark, 96 U. S.
37 (1877).
49 Southland Industries v.Federal Communications Comm'n, 99 F.2d 117,121
(D. C. Cir. 1938).
43 As to this problem, see generally: Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies, 48 YALE L. J. 981-1006 (1939).
44 United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161 (1904); Myers v. Bethlehem
Ship Building Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938); Federal Power Comm'n v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 304 U. S. 375 (1938); Seeako, Primary Jurisdiction-Effect ol
Administrative Remedies on the Jurisdiction of Courts, 51 HAtv. L. RIv. 1251
(1938); The Necessity of Exhausting Administrative Remedies before Resorting
to Judicial Review, 27 COL. L. REv. 450 (1927).
45 FEDERAL PowEa Aar, 49 STAT. 860 (1935), 16 U. S. C. §825 (1) (1946);
Federal Power Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U. S. 375 (1938).
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by the court unless such objection shall have been urged below,"40
has been held to require a petition for rehearing as a prerequisite
to judicial review. 47 The Federal Communications Act has a pro-
vision, seemingly permissive in character, allowing rehearings s4
but this provision has been held to require an application for
rehearing as a prerequisite to judicial review.49  It has been held
that where, by statute, a party to an order "shall" have the right
to apply for a rehearing then such application is a condition
precedent to judicial review. 0 The tenor of these decisions, though
statutes expressly provided for rehearings, is that the power of an
agency to grant a rehearing is an integral and essential procedural
function of the agency, and is in fact an aid to the courts. rl Whether
the power is spelled out by the statute, or is implied from the dis-
cretionary powers to promulgate rules of practice and procedure
would seem immaterial.
Apropos of the problem of an agency's powers to grant rehear-
ing on petition is the question of such agency's power to order
rehearings on its own motion. Where a statute expressly gives the
agency power to grant rehearing on petition it has been held that
the agency is by implication authorized to order a rehearing on its
own motion.r2  It" would seem to follow that where there is no
explicit authorization to grant a rehearing on petition but the
recognition of an implied power to do so, the implication should
include the agency's authority to reopen proceedings and grant
rehearings on its own motion.
T. E. M.
R. B. P.
46 BITUMINOUS COAL AcT, 50 STAT. 72 (1937), 15 U. S. C. §836 (b) (1946).
47 Mallory Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 99 F.2d 399
(D. C. Cir. 1938).
48 48 STAT. 1095 (1934), 47 U. S. C. §405 (1946).
49 Red River Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 98
F.2d 554 (D. C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 625 (1938); Sainaw Broad-
casting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 96 F.2d 554 (D. C. Cir. 1938).
50 Consumers' Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Idaho, 40 Idaho 772, 236
Pac. 732 (1925). IDAHo COMP. STATS. §2503 (1919) provided: "After an order
has been made by the commission, any corporation . . . or person interested
therein shall have the right to apply for a rehearing .... and the commission
shall grant such rehearing if in its judgment sufficient reason be made to appear."
r, But the rehearing device should not be used as a subterfuge for needlessly
delaying or unnecessarily prolonging the administrative process. Whether a
petition for rehearing should be considered as a prerequisite to judicial review
under the exhaustion doctrine (where the statute does not so require) is for
the reviewing court, in its sound discretion, to determine. Levers v. Anderson,
326 U. S. 219 (1945), noted in 44 MICH. L. REv. 1045 (1946).
52 Sprague v. Woll, 122 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 669
(1941); Froeber-Norfleet v. Southern Ry., 9 F. Supp. 409 (N. D. Ga. 1954).
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